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Introduction
Recent economic policy writing about Solomon 
Islands has frequently attributed slow develop-
ment progress to the ‘wantok system’ and its 
incompatibility with the delivery of the political 
and administrative functions required of a modern 
state (Fukuyama 2008; Duncan 2010; Duncan 
and Nakagawa 2007; Hughes 2004; ADB 2010; 
Gay 2009). Within this technocratic literature, 
‘wantokism’ is seldom precisely defined or placed 
within an adequate historical or cultural frame, but 
is often used as a loose catch-all term for various 
real or perceived collectivist elements of Solomon 
Islands’ culture. While possessing strengths in terms 
of delivering equity and social cohesion, wantokism 
is said to fundamentally impede Solomon Islands 
society’s capacity to deal with collective action prob-
lems due to the continued embeddedness of political 
leadership within personalised networks of reciproc-
ity (Fukuyama 2008:1–2). Wantokism is, therefore, 
to blame for endemic problems of political instabil-
ity, corruption, and slow private sector development 
— problems that require Western professionalised 
bureaucratic forms to adequately manage. The only 
solution is cultural change and the inculcation of a 
sense of national identity, which donors have limited 
scope to facilitate and can only be achieved over 
many decades. Such arguments have achieved broad 
legitimacy within the local development community, 
and are recited by development practitioners far 
more frequently than more nuanced discussions of 
interactions between development and Melanesian 
culture within the anthropology, geography, history, 
and political science literatures.1 
In this paper, I present a political-economy 
critique of culturally based explanations for uneven 
development progress in Solomon Islands. I argue 
that the behaviours frequently blamed for slow-
ing economic development and social progress are 
primarily driven by perverse material incentives 
prevailing under existing policy and institutional 
settings. While various cultural factors doubtlessly 
influence behaviour, the behaviours that commen- 
tators and development practitioners are most 
concerned about are entirely consistent with tradi-
tional economic models emphasising the tendency 
of individuals to act in their material self-interest. 
Understanding poor outcomes in Solomon Islands 
as the result of perverse material incentives facing 
individuals, rather than a result of the local culture, 
is more useful from a policy perspective and avoids 
the unjustified problematising of Solomon Islands 
culture. By applying this framework, I identify a 
range of practical policy priorities to ameliorate 
existing perverse material incentives and accelerate 
development progress. 
The paper focuses on the causes of three key 
development problems facing Solomon Islands: weak 
political and policy cohesion, poor public adminis-
tration, and limited private sector development. The 
paper is divided into four sections. In the first, I out- 
line key facts regarding the current economic and 
social context in Solomon Islands. In the second, I 
explain recent arguments regarding the importance 
of the wantok system as a cultural constraint to 
development. In the third section, I demonstrate that 
poor development outcomes in Solomon Islands can 
be explained in terms of the material incentives  
facing individuals, without re-course to cultural 
arguments. In the final section, I identify the implica-
tions of this analysis for development interventions. 
I highlight the role played by international donors 
in contributing to existing perverse incentives, and 
recommend tangible policy reforms through which 
these incentives could be ameliorated or removed. 
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The Solomon Islands Context
The lives of Solomon Islanders have improved 
markedly over the past seven years. The arrival 
of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) quickly ended a protracted civil 
conflict and laid the foundations for the restoration 
of law and order, macroeconomic stability, expan-
sion of basic services, and reasonable rates of  
economic growth.2 
But recent gains were possible only through 
international assistance, and could easily be reversed 
if such assistance was scaled back or withdrawn. 
Nearly 80 per cent of Solomon Islanders believe that 
law and order would break down or violence return 
if the international peacekeeping force were to leave 
(ANU Enterprises 2010:100). Current levels of basic 
service delivery depend heavily on aid funding and 
foreign technical assistance.3 Economic growth has 
been driven by an unsustainable logging boom and 
expansion of government and donor expenditure. 
With more than US$1 billion of aid spent since 
2003 (around US$2,000 for each Solomon Islander), 
Solomon Islands remains the poorest of the Pacific 
Island states, with Millennium Development 
Goals (MDG) progress and Human Development 
Indicators to match.4 Endemic problems of incon-
sistent political leadership, poorly performing public 
services, limited private sector development, and 
ubiquitous misuse of public resources remain press-
ing. Overall, vast sums of donor money are being 
used to deliver stability and services with some 
reasonable success. But the broader ambitions of 
sustainable socioeconomic change and MDG-level 
living standards remain a distant dream. 
The Argument from Culture
In this section, I review culturally based explana-
tions for the failure to embed a more sustainable 
model of development in Solomon Islands, advanced 
by proponents of the culture thesis, and now fre-
quently reflected in the discourse of development 
practitioners working in the region. I examine these 
explanations in relation to three key development 
problems facing Solomon Islands: 1) weak political 
and policy cohesion, 2) poor public administration, 
and 3) limited private sector development.
Proponents of the culture thesis argue that the 
absence of political and policy cohesion in Solomon 
Islands is caused by wantok loyalties distorting 
electoral dynamics. Within the Solomon Islands 
Westminster democratic system, voters support can-
didates with whom they share common descent and 
hold high status within wantok groups, rather than 
on the basis of expected or past performance in 
providing improvements in policy or services. This 
weakens incentives for elected leaders to deliver 
such improvements. As important, it impedes the 
coagulation of elected representatives into politi-
cal parties around ideological or political fissures. 
Instead, governments made up of individual MPs 
elected on the basis of their capacity to represent 
parochial wantok identities and interests, form tem-
porary and opportunistic allegiances built around 
the sharing of rents. Very simply, because of the 
strength of the wantok system and because of a lack 
of a sense of national identity, the first-past-the-post 
system produces not a strong two-party system, 
but a highly unstable mixture of weak parties and 
independent parliamentarians, who then negotiate 
the creation of coalition government and divide the 
political spoils between them (Fukuyama 2008:5). 
The primary goal of elected leaders is to ‘raise 
or reinforce local political standing through the 
wantok system of kinship and allegiance’ (ADB 
2010). As a result, allegiances are short-lived, and 
political parties have neither the incentives nor the 
longevity required to deliver much-needed  
economic and governance reforms (Gay 2009:103). 
Similar lines of reasoning have been adapted to  
explain poor performance within the Solomon 
Islands’ bureaucracy.5 Proponents of the culture 
thesis argue that, with ‘indigenisation’ of the civil 
service following independence in 1978, paramount 
loyalties to wantok interests came to trump any 
national interest considerations of civil servants. 
According to this argument, without a shared sense 
of national identity guiding the conduct of key offi-
cials, independence led to a ‘decline in professional 
standards’, with nepotism and political interference 
undermining the ability of the bureaucracy to deliv-
er on government policy priorities (ADB 2009:i; 
Fukuyama 2008:5). Politically appointed positions 
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within central ministries came to be allocated in 
ways that maintain patronage networks, rather than 
serve the needs of the country. Officials and justice 
authorities now bend or break the rules for personal 
advantage, or to bring benefit to wantok members. 
Promotions are often based on personal connections 
and favor rather than performance. As a conse-
quence, talented staff often leave the public service, 
exacerbating capacity gaps, and worsening morale. 
Proponents of the culture thesis see the consequenc-
es as ubiquitous. The administration of justice is a 
prime example, where ‘cultural pressure to look after 
relatives can lead to retribution against the Police 
Officers if they try to remain impartial’ (Fukuyama 
2008:8). Similarly, within the utility sector, ‘weak 
governance due to wantokism … is one of the major 
causes of poor SOE performance’ (Gay 2009:103).
Much has also been written about the negative 
impacts of wantokism on private sector development. 
Proponents of the culture thesis echo a well-travelled 
litany in singling out customary land ownership as 
the ‘primary reason for deprivation in rural Pacific 
communities’ (Hughes 2004:4). The collective 
ownership of land and natural resources by descent-
based groups presents an insurmountable barrier to 
commercial agriculture and foreign investment, as 
there are multiple ‘claimants to a particular parcel 
of land, no strong tradition of delegated author-
ity, and no statute of limitations with regards to 
customary claims’ (Fukuyama 2008:4). As a result, 
it is ‘extremely difficult’ for landowners to convert 
customary land into alienable property. Customary 
ownership within the wantok system therefore both 
denies potential investors secure tenure, and also 
inhibits entrepreneurialism by preventing the use 
of land for collateral to access loans.6 Such views 
continue to motivate regular donor calls for ‘land 
reform’ despite more recent policy work pointing out 
the potential for private sector development in the 
context of customary tenure arrangements.7
Wantokism has also been accused of inhibiting 
private sector development in Melanesia in ways 
beyond its curtailment of the productive use of 
land and natural resources. Renzio (2000:22) cites 
the ‘common tale’ of an income-earning individual 
who finds it impossible to save or reinvest because 
of the heavy demand that wantoks place on scarce 
earnings. Without individualised property rights, 
widespread social expectations that wealth and 
income will be shared within the social group reduce 
incentives for investment and entrepreneurial effort, 
and reduce the likelihood that established businesses 
will succeed. Dickson (1995:44) notes how wantok 
traits are a ‘very common problem’ in enterprise 
development, with many businesses closing due to 
the obligation to extend credit to wantoks. 
Standing the Culture Thesis on Its Head
While culture inevitably shapes some aspects of 
certain behaviours in any society, it is important 
to recognise that cultural norms and behaviours 
also evolve in response to broader economic and 
social realities.8 Far from constraining the actions 
of individuals to timeless and mystified unalterable 
norms, wantok behaviours have historically been 
cherry-picked and adapted by Solomon Islanders, 
from a menu of traditions and customs from a 
plethora of specific group cultures, in response 
to changing material conditions and imperatives 
arising since colonialism (Brigg 2009). It seems 
unlikely that Solomon Islanders would insist on the 
maintenance of practices that doom them to failure 
within the modern global economy purely because 
they were elements of inherited cultural traditions.
In this section, I argue that the detrimental 
behaviours described above could more usefully 
be explained in terms of the material incentives 
facing individuals. While culture may influence 
behaviour, it is abundantly clear that the behaviours 
that development practitioners are most concerned 
about are strongly encouraged by pervading materi-
al incentives arising under current institutional and 
policy settings. This insight is helpful, as it allows 
us to understand slow progress in Solomon Islands 
without assigning culpability to Solomon Islands 
culture, while also illustrating a broader range of 
potential policy remedies. I make this point by fur-
ther examining the three examples discussed above.
The Political Economy of Electoral Politics
There is little doubt that short-term parochial or 
personal factors often have a determining influ-
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ence on electoral outcomes in Solomon Islands 
and that this precludes the emergence of a stable 
party system capable of delivering strategic policy 
reform. But cultural factors such as wantokism and 
a lack of national identity are not the most intui-
tive explanations for voters’ focus on short-term 
considerations. 
Voter behaviour in Solomon Islands reflects the 
broader economic context. Most Solomon Islanders 
support themselves through subsistence produc-
tion. Eighty-five per cent of Solomon Islanders live 
in rural areas. Cash-economy opportunities are 
limited, concentrated around a very small number 
of cash crops, and sensitive to changes in global 
commodity prices. Recent economic analyses have 
suggested that this is unlikely to change, with a 
World Bank report noting that ‘few small countries’ 
face as many disadvantages from geography, and 
concluding that ‘Solomon Islands is unlikely to be 
able to provide a competitive business environ-
ment for manufacturing or service exports’ (World 
Bank 2010:7). Reflecting this reality, most Solomon 
Islanders remain only partially integrated into the  
cash economy, and typically modulate their 
engagement — for example, through the extent of 
production of copra for wholesalers — depending 
on changes in prices and costs. Subsistence stan-
dards of living are fairly high, with very low levels 
of food poverty. 
With little participation in the formal sector, 
and severe geographical constraints to the expan-
sion of the private sector in the near future, interest 
in economic reform measures is limited for most 
Solomon Islanders. The impacts of economic 
reforms are weak, lagged, and mediated by a range of 
idiosyncratic factors. Any impacts that can be felt are 
dwarfed by other fluctuations in economic fortunes 
that are entirely beyond the control of government, 
including those arising from changes in global com-
modity prices and other economic shocks. 
Most Solomon Islanders are similarly presented 
with few reasons to care deeply about central gov-
ernment decisions regarding public services and 
infrastructure. In most areas, the only manifesta-
tion of government is a network of rural clinics 
and schools which, while relatively successful in 
providing basic access, are of highly uneven quality. 
Only a small proportion of Solomon Islanders have 
any access to economic infrastructure, and most 
businesses are in the informal sector, and seldom 
comply with formal regulatory requirements. 
Further, central government control over 
services and infrastructure is heavily constrained. 
Community-level education authorities have a 
strong influence on day-to-day administrative 
arrangements in schools, and donor financing 
accounts for a large proportion of both the health 
and education expenditure, with co-financing 
requirements effectively insulating sectoral budgets 
from government allocation decisions (Porter  
et al. 2010:65; Pretorius et al. 2008). Community 
infrastructure and supplemental health and 
education services are often provided by bilateral 
or multilateral donors, or non-government 
organisations, with resource allocation deliberately 
insulated to varying degrees from central govern-
ment discretion. Large donor projects, such as the  
World Bank’s Rural Development Program and the  
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)/
United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) 
Provincial Government Strengthening Program, 
while working within government systems, leave 
actual project-selection decisions to community 
boards and provincial government respectively. 
Micro-project financing from bilateral donors 
and the European Community is allocated to 
specific projects on a contestable basis without any 
coordination with central government ministries. 
Constituency funds are a potent addition to this 
mix. Through the constituency fund system, indi-
vidual MPs are provided with SBD$2 million per 
annum to deliver ‘development projects’ on a largely 
discretionary basis.9 When considered relative to 
typical incomes in rural areas, these funds are very 
significant, especially in small isolated constituen-
cies, and often represent the largest source of cash 
to a given community (far outstripping earnings 
from employment). There has never been any 
serious attempt to subject these funds to central 
government scrutiny or planning processes. While 
constituency funds are sometimes used to deliver 
vital infrastructure to underserved areas, they are 
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more often used simply to provide cash payments 
or private goods to important constituents around 
election time. A community or household may be 
promised a much-needed water-tank if they sup-
port a particular candidate. The practice of casting 
a vote for a certain candidate in exchange for cash 
or bags of rice is also ubiquitous. 
In this context, it would take not just a very 
strong sense of national identity, but also an unusu-
al preoccupation with long-term interests, a rarely 
overpowering altruism, and a similar faith in the 
altruism of others for any individual to base their 
voting behaviour on a candidate’s national policy 
positions, rather than on the likelihood of a particu-
lar candidate providing direct benefits to the local 
community. It is not realistic to expect Solomon 
Islanders to give up substantial immediate benefits 
— in the form of social status, much-needed cash 
through handouts, or the benefits of constituency 
fund projects — in order to support a government 
committed to better services, when the majority of 
services are provided by other parties. It is not real-
istic to expect a voter to support reforms that enable 
higher rates of growth in the formal economy when 
their exposure to changes in the formal economy 
is weak, lagged, and dominated by idiosyncratic 
fluctuations of the global economy. 
Even if an individual was inclined to make 
such a trade-off, they would only rationally expect 
to derive any benefits from that voting decision 
if a large proportion of Solomon Islanders were 
similarly inclined. A rational voter would only even 
consider foregoing direct benefit in the hope of 
broader improvement if they believed that a good 
proportion of other voters would make the same 
trade-off. Giving up personal benefit to support 
better policy is even less appealing if that vote 
would be wasted on a losing candidate in a first-
past-the-post system. 
Overall, the voting behaviour of Solomon 
Islanders is entirely consistent with pervading 
material incentives. The candidates who win are 
largely those best able to strategically distribute 
patronage to key constituents. The benefits of 
receiving patronage far exceed the likely benefits 
from improved policy when the lag between 
improved policy and potential improvements in 
life quality, the limited exposure of most Solomon 
Islanders to the formal economy, and the limited 
impact of central government decision-making on 
basic service delivery, are taken into account. 
The Political Economy of Bureaucratic 
Performance
Some government employees in Solomon Islands 
use their official powers to benefit wantok 
members, either through favour in the provision 
of goods and services, or through hiring and 
remuneration decisions (ADB 2010).10 Conveying 
such benefits enhances social status and establishes 
reciprocity obligations that can be expected to bring 
future benefits, informal social security insurance, 
and political support. 
The incentive for government employees to use 
their official powers to benefit related individuals or 
groups is hardly unique to Solomon Islands, and 
such practices are observed around the world.11 
Solomon Islands may be unusual, however, in the 
extent to which institutional arrangements fail to mute 
or balance incentives towards kin-based loyalties.
Incentives for strong bureaucratic performance 
in Solomon Islands are weak. At the highest 
levels of government, there is an almost complete 
absence of clarity regarding what is to be achieved 
and who is to achieve it. Ministers, often new to 
government and provided with little information 
by a stretched and politicised bureaucracy, seldom 
have explicit objectives for their departments to 
achieve or good knowledge of what their depart-
ments currently deliver. Mandates of various 
departments are often unclear, and outputs are not 
listed in any centralised documentation. Planning 
documents are of variable quality, often drafted for 
or by donors, and seldom implemented. Ministry 
corporate plans are mandated for all departments, 
but not always prepared. Those that exist typically 
contain an unrealistically large number of goals, 
with very few goals accompanied by performance 
measures. Very few planning documents, ranging 
from the National Development Strategy to the 
corporate plans of individual ministries, are costed, 
preventing any linkage between policy goals and 
resource allocation. The national budget is pre-
pared on an inputs basis, and does not align to the 
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goals or objectives of the government or individual 
ministries. Ministries do not report on the use of 
funds by activity, and performance audits are not 
carried out. While some progress in improving 
public finance systems and accountability arrange-
ments is currently being achieved, overall, there 
remains little clarity in terms of what resources are 
being provided to which ministry to achieve which 
objective. There is even less clarity as to what has 
been achieved. 
Weaknesses at the institutional level influ-
ence the incentives facing individual bureaucrats. 
Performance management systems are either weak 
or non-existent in most government departments. 
Measurement of performance is not adequate to 
consistently inform performance-based progression, 
and — with remuneration and benefit schemes 
highly distorted by inconsistent non-salary allow-
ances — incentives for progression are weak. 
Disciplinary procedures are outdated, complex, and 
inconsistent, with managers reporting an inability 
to discipline staff performing inadequately or 
engaging in inappropriate behaviour. 
Financial audit and accountability systems are 
also weak. Recent progress in strengthening the 
Office of the Auditor General (OAG) and bringing 
the audited accounts of government departments 
up to date has revealed severe weaknesses in pro-
cesses, and many incidences of corruption across 
government. In 2007, the OAG released the ‘Auditor 
General’s Insights into Corruption’, which sum-
marised the main findings and recommendations 
from all previous work, including fifteen special 
investigations of irregularities involving several 
instances where MPs were implicated. The Public 
Accounts Committee was presented with the sum-
mary findings, and has held ‘deliberative meetings’ 
but has yet to formally implement any plan of action 
to address findings systematically. OAG referrals to 
the Public Prosecutor are seldom acted upon.
The ultimate cause of much of this dysfunction 
is the absence of institutional structures ensuring 
ministers’ accountability for the operational per-
formance of departments within their portfolios, 
or across government as a whole. The Westminster 
model of bureaucratic accountability to a minister, 
and ministerial accountability to the public for ser-
vice delivery and good policy simply does not work. 
The problem is not just that the systems are broken, 
but that those in positions of power have no incen-
tive to see them changed. While many ministers 
have championed reform and the longer term inter-
ests of Solomon Islands, they have done so despite, 
rather than because of, the institutional incentives 
that they face. The political economy of electoral 
politics permeates down to the political economy 
of bureaucratic performance, with management of 
constituency funds and political allegiances squeez-
ing out, and frequently conflicting with, ministers’ 
ministry and policy oversight roles. Ministers are 
not held accountable for service delivery by their 
electorates, and therefore do not hold bureaucrats 
accountable for performance in the delivery of 
services. Over time, this absence of accountability 
has weakened administrative systems to the point 
where ministers lack the information required to 
demand and measure improved performance. 
Many officials within the Solomon Islands 
Government are highly performing and motivated 
by a desire to contribute to national welfare. But 
the institutional incentives encouraging such 
behaviour are weak or non-existent. It is not real-
istic to expect Solomon Islands public servants to 
spontaneously adopt the professional behaviours 
associated with developed-world bureaucracies 
when such behaviours are not systematically 
rewarded, and where deviations from such behav-
iour are not systematically sanctioned. 
The Political Economy of Private Sector 
Development
Collective ownership of resources and compulsion 
of individuals to socialise the returns from 
investment and entrepreneurial activity inevitably 
reduces incentives to engage in such behaviours. It 
seems reasonable to expect that Solomon Islanders 
are less likely to engage in entrepreneurialism and 
investment if they are compelled to share profits 
with free-riders. Ascribing the tendency to share 
profits to unavoidable cultural imperatives is 
problematic, however, for several reasons. 
Firstly, there are many examples of such pres-
sures being avoided by particular individuals and 
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ventures when viable investment projects exist. 
Recent research has emphasised successes in 
productive management of land under customary 
ownership, and resolving issues associated with 
development of land under customary tenure 
through creative contracting and benefit-sharing 
arrangements (Fingleton 2005; IKI 2010). Others 
have demonstrated that Solomon Island entre-
preneurs, themselves, do not consider wantok 
pressures to be either insurmountable, or even the 
largest barrier to doing business (Haque and Greig 
2010). Successful business people have adopted 
strategies for managing wantok pressures, includ-
ing: locating business ventures in areas away from 
where such pressures were most strongly felt, 
distributing only a predetermined and affordable 
portion of profits to wantok members, and incor-
porating reciprocity into social arrangements, with 
those sharing in entrepreneurs’ profits expected to 
contribute labor or other assistance. 
More importantly, the observed tendencies 
towards socialisation of wealth often seem to 
reflect rational and, arguably, efficient individual 
responses to the inherent volatility and limited 
global integration of the Solomon Islands economy. 
Reliant on natural forest log exports and small-
holder cash-cropping of commodities subject to 
high levels of price volatility, Solomon Islands has 
experienced some of the greatest variation in output 
across Pacific island nations and other compara-
tor countries since 1996, in the context of conflict 
and subsequent resource-driven recovery. The 
absence of viable projects under existing models of 
market-led development may be a more important 
constraint than social pressures towards the sociali-
sation of returns. 
Pooling of risk through informal reciprocity 
networks can be understood as a rational response 
to economic risk and limits to growth. Particular 
individuals utilise this strategy to greater and lesser 
extents, depending on personal risk tolerances and 
access to opportunities. Continued servicing of 
kinship obligations ensures ongoing membership in 
the kin group, and therefore access to a basic social 
insurance mechanism and land within the village 
for themselves and their descendents. This repre-
sents a good option for many Solomon Islanders. 
Other Solomon Islanders, having achieved more 
secure positions within the formal economy have 
proven themselves capable of being insulated from 
Figure 1: Volatility in Output—Solomon Islands and Comparators
Source: International Monetary Fund and World Bank data
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pressures towards wealth socialisation — at least to 
the extent necessary to maintain the profitability of 
their businesses. 
Policy Implications
It is easy to see that people act in various ways in 
Solomon Islands that are not always in the best 
interests of the country, or well aligned to classical 
development goals. But to explain these behaviours 
solely as the result of culture is incomplete and 
also heavily constraining from a policy perspective. 
Explaining such behaviours as the result of per-
verse material incentives is more fruitful, avoiding 
the vilification of local traditions and values, and 
providing a practical framework for identifying 
reform priorities. 
I outline here some policy implications aris-
ing from the incentives-based analysis presented 
above. I emphasise implications for donor agencies 
because they are — at least to a greater extent 
than many Solomon Island policy-makers — not 
benefitting from the existing perverse incentives 
and, therefore, more likely to be motivated to 
instigate change. Potential policy recommenda-
tions can be divided into two sets: those concerned 
with correcting existing perverse incentives within 
the Solomon Islands electoral system, and those 
concerned with enhancing incentives for broader 
private-sector development. 
Making Electoral Politics Matter
The most significant challenge facing Solomon 
Islands is to better align the incentives of individual 
MPs with the broader public interest, rather 
than the parochial interests of their electorates 
and wantok members. Without this change, it is 
difficult to imagine sustainable improvements 
in either national policy, or the emergence of 
a performance and results focus within the 
bureaucracy. Electoral reform would provide the 
most effective channel for achieving this alignment. 
But even in the absence of a fundamental 
restructuring of electoral politics, donors could 
support several actions to strengthen accountability 
on MPs for service delivery and good policy. 
The greatest weakness of the current electoral 
system is its tendency to focus the attention 
of parliamentarians on the interests of small, 
geographically concentrated constituencies, at the 
expense of broader, national interests. The small 
size of constituencies in Solomon Islands, and the 
huge influence that MPs can command through 
access to and control over even relatively limited 
resources within these constituencies creates ideal 
conditions for patronage-based politics. During 
the 2006 election, only two MPs secured a majority 
within their constituency (Fraenkel 2008:160). The 
average candidate secured their seat by winning 
support from 30 per cent of constituents, or just 
over 1,000 votes, a substantial decline on previous 
years reflecting increases in the number of candi-
dates standing for election in each seat.12 MPs have 
become accountable solely for their success in 
distributing political rents to a very small group of 
individuals. Issues of national interest — including 
economic policy and government service delivery 
— are largely ignored during elections. 
While detailed recommendations for electoral 
reform are beyond the scope of this paper and the 
expertise of its author, a key priority for long-term 
development in Solomon Islands must be the intro-
duction of a reformed electoral system that broad-
ens accountability of MPs to a larger and more 
geographically dispersed range of constituents. 
Dilution of patronage over a larger base of constitu-
ents can change the relative payoffs that voters can 
expect from maintaining a patronage-based  
relationship, rather than supporting a candidate 
with the best policies. Such concerns have moti-
vated electoral reforms in other parts of Melanesia 
and there is scope to learn from the mixed success 
of these experiences.13
Even in the absence of fundamental electoral 
reforms, donors could take several steps to weaken 
existing avenues of patronage and increase account-
ability of MPs for service delivery. The first of these 
is to reduce current reliance on parallel financing of 
development projects. In 2008, only US$16 million, 
or around seven per cent of a total US$229 million 
in overseas development assistance was formally 
appropriated through the Solomon Islands’ budget. 
Across Solomon Islands Government, donors 
account for more than 125 vertical projects in 26 
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ministries, many of which are executed through 
project management units.14 Most donor financ-
ing — with the partial exception of New Zealand 
education sector spending and recently provided 
direct budget support from Australia, the European 
Community, and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) — has vertical controls and execution 
arrangements that are designed to limit administra-
tive discretion. These controls have the effect of 
limiting the ways in which elected politicians can, 
and can be seen to, influence project implementa-
tion (Porter, Haque, and Bottrill, 2010:65). Citizens 
therefore routinely perceive that responsibility (and 
accountability) for service delivery resides with 
donors rather than government. MPs cannot be 
held accountable by citizens for service delivery 
if MPs do not have control over service delivery. 
With important aspects of public service provision 
beyond the control of MPs, electoral attention inev-
itably focuses more closely on the things that MPs 
have indisputable control over: the allocation of 
constituency funds and other forms of patronage.
By channelling greater resources through 
government administrative systems, accountability 
links between citizens and representative can 
be strengthened, and the relative importance of 
patronage politics diminished. A key challenge for 
donors is to increase their use of central govern-
ment systems in the distribution and administra-
tion of support to service delivery and livelihoods. 
The constituency fund system must also 
be reformed. Constituency funds represent the 
most visible manifestation of government in 
many areas. Fifty per cent funded by Taiwan, 
these funds are used with perfunctory planning 
processes, little monitoring of project quality, and 
often inadequate accounting for use of funds. It 
may prove politically unfeasible for constituency 
funds to be abolished. Processes, however, could 
be improved to see such funds integrated into 
allocation mechanisms less susceptible to patronage 
— for example, by channeling constituency funds 
into existing community infrastructure funds 
where they would be subject to transparent and 
well-governed allocation processes, involving 
widespread community participation. Such 
changes could be encouraged by donors through 
offering co-financing inducements — effectively 
offering MPs a political payoff from channeling 
constituency fund resources through good processes 
by increasing the amount of infrastructure that 
they could be seen to be contributing. Folding 
constituency funds into more transparent and 
participatory allocation processes would reduce the  
capacity of MPs to use constituency funds for patro-
nage. With constituency funds less politicised, there 
would be scope for greater political attention to be 
paid to broader issues of service delivery and policy.
Finally, dysfunction in subnational government 
must be addressed. Roles and responsibilities of 
provincial government are not clear, and provincial 
government responsibilities overlap with central 
government mandates (Cox and Morrison 2004). 
Unclear and overlapping mandates between 
provincial and central government led to a lack 
of accountability for service delivery, with central 
government and provincial administrations 
able to blame one another for service gaps. 
The current lack of resourcing for subnational 
delivery of services also magnifies the importance 
of constituency funds — without access to 
effective local-level administration, discretionary 
expenditure of constituency fund resources by 
MPs becomes a vital lifeline for services and basic 
infrastructure in many rural areas. 
Continued iterative efforts to clarify the 
respective roles and responsibilities of provincial 
and local government and ensure the provision 
of commensurate resourcing, through the current 
UNDP-supported program, need to be sustained. 
But a key step is a first-principles assessment of the 
appropriate representational and service-delivery 
functions of provincial governments in the Solomon 
Islands context. 
Supporting Economic Participation
Observed tendencies towards collective manage-
ment of resources and socialisation of profit may 
constrain growth in some instances. But these 
behaviours also reflect a rational and internation-
ally common adaptation to a context in which there 
are high risks and low returns from participation in 
the cash economy. Improving returns and reducing 
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risk on private entrepreneurial activity may repre-
sent the best opportunity for changing behaviour. 
As in nearly all countries at Solomon Islands’ 
level of development, a key requirement for better 
returns to private investment is to improve the 
provision of the public goods that underpin pro-
ductive activity. 
Strengthening transport, telecommunications, 
and energy infrastructure, and investing in the 
human capital required for enhanced participation 
in the global economy is core business for donors 
and governments. In the absence of basic public 
services such as education, roads, electricity, and 
a functional legal and contracting environment, 
businesses face higher costs in production and 
accessing markets, eroding returns and discourag-
ing private investment.
But, given immutable geographic barriers 
inevitably limiting the feasible nature and scale 
of private sector activity, across-the-board invest-
ments in the broad range of public services and 
institutions underpinning market activity in 
developed countries is unlikely to be either within 
the means of the Solomon Islands Government, or 
cost-effective.15 There are simply not enough viable 
business opportunities to make investment in 
market-enabling services and institutions economi-
cal across all areas of Solomon Islands. 
But more can still be done to enhance incen-
tives for private entrepreneurship. Recent economic 
analysis has highlighted the importance of a more 
targeted approach to investment in public services 
and infrastructure to support economic develop-
ment, emphasising the likelihood that economic 
growth will continue to be concentrated in certain 
sectors, and geographic regions of the country. In 
this context, it makes sense for public investment 
to be similarly concentrated around centres of 
economic activity, with transport investments care-
fully planned to maximise access between centres 
of economic concentration, and areas where people 
live. This approach has the potential to open new 
business opportunities (World Bank 2010).
But the costs of doing business in Solomon 
Islands will remain high, and prospects for 
competitive exporting in manufacturing and 
services are likely to be fundamentally constrained 
(World Bank 2010).16 If donors wish to spur 
private sector activity, another important priority 
is therefore to expand reliance on private provision 
in the delivery of government and donor-financed 
social services and infrastructure. Ensuring 
that a greater proportion of aid is spent locally 
can dramatically increase opportunities for 
entrepreneurship within the economy, encouraging 
the development of businesses supplying donor 
contracts or the large community of international 
aid workers. Opportunities for private participation 
in service delivery can both improve efficiency and 
prime the pump for broader private sector growth 
by encouraging the development of entrepreneurial 
skills, and the achievement of a critical mass in 
the number of operational businesses (Haque and 
Greig 2010; Peace Dividend Trust 2009).17 
 Internationally, the establishment of conditions 
in which entrepreneurial activity is possible has 
quickly led to the emergence of such activity and 
the erosion of cultural expectations and behaviours 
that excessively impede it. It is difficult to see why 
this would not be the case in Solomon Islands. 
Conclusions
Certain commonly observed behaviours impede 
the economic and social development of Solomon 
Islands. These behaviours include parliamentarians’ 
excessive focus on the short-term, parochial interests 
of a small number of constituents, bureaucrats’ 
proclivity to nepotism and corruption, and the exer-
tion of social pressure towards the socialisation of 
the wealth and income of successful business people. 
These behaviours have consistently been explained 
through a cultural narrative: Solomon Islanders 
behave the way they do because of their culture. 
Analysis of pervading material incentives 
within electoral politics, the public service, and 
the private sector provides an alternative lens 
for understanding these behaviours. Solomon 
Islanders, like most people, are strongly influenced 
by material incentives. Existing institutional and 
economic conditions in Solomon Islands create 
strong material incentives for individuals to behave 
in ways that impede broader development progress. 
Applying this framework is useful, because it 
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avoids vilification of Solomon Islands culture, and 
shows how — by doing things differently — the 
international community can begin to reverse 
some of the perverse incentives it has unwittingly 
contributed to creating. 
Elected parliamentarians will not be held 
accountable for their success in improving services 
and policy until a far greater proportion of service 
delivery is controlled, and perceived to be con-
trolled, by central government. Donors must begin 
to make greater use of budget support modalities 
and central government systems in providing 
services. Flows of discretionary resources to MPs, 
which currently fuel patronage-based politics, must 
be better managed. Options for electoral reform, 
to reduce incentives to focus on the short-term, 
parochial interests of small constituencies, must 
be considered. Only when there is an accountable 
political leadership can an effective and account-
able public service be expected to emerge. 
Donors can also play a role in strengthening 
incentives for entrepreneurialism and participation 
in the cash economy. By moving towards a more 
geographically targeted approach to infrastructure 
and service provision, the critical public services 
and infrastructure for private sector activity can 
be provided to the required scale in at least some 
areas. Donors can also do more to ensure that a 
greater proportion of aid expenditure flows into 
the local economy, creating opportunities for 
entrepreneurship and private sector development 
that might otherwise be fundamentally con-
strained in a context with such limited potential 
for export competitiveness. The presence of secure 
private sector opportunities will reduce Solomon 
Islanders’ reliance on the informal risk-sharing 
and reciprocity arrangements that are currently 
accused of hindering economic development. 
Acknowledgements
Edith Bowles provided vital input throughout the 
preparation of this paper. Invaluable comments on 
an earlier draft were provided by David Ehrhardt, 
Douglas Porter, and Seini O’Connor. The paper 
also benefited substantially from comments pro-
vided by two anonymous peer reviewers.
Author Notes
Tobias Haque is an economist with the World Bank. 
He lived and worked in Solomon Islands during 
2009 and 2010. The views expressed in this article 
are solely those of the author and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the World Bank Group, its part-
ner organisations or its member states.
Endnotes
1 For more nuanced discussions of the interplay 
between culture and development in Solomon Islands 
from other disciplines see, for example, Steeves  
(1996), Bennett (2000), Fraenkel (2004) and  
Kabutaulaka (2000, 2006). 
2 According to World Bank data, the Solomon Islands 
economy has grown at an average rate of 5.3 per cent 
per annum since 2003.
3 Official aid flows to Solomon Islands were equivalent 
to 43 per cent of gross national income in 2009. In that 
year, aid flows accounted for more than 30 per cent of 
recurrent expenditure on health, and more than 10 per 
cent of recurrent expenditure on education. 
4 According to a recent UNDP assessment (Ministry of 
Development Planning and Aid Coordination 2010), 
Solomon Islands is on track to achieve just three of 
the eight MDGs. 
5    The ADB (2010:107) has noted with alarm the 
‘killer risk’ of ‘well-resourced sectional interests to 
exercise undue influence over the government, thus 
corrupting government business’.
6 See, for one of many examples, a recent assessment 
of the financial services sector in several Pacific 
island countries commissioned by the UNDP and the 
UNCDF (Flaming and Mathison 2007:4) which states 
that ‘traditional forms of land ownership present the 
single most significant challenge to financial service 
providers’. 
7 See, for example, AusAID (2008).
8 See the preface to Marx (1993) for a fuller elaboration 
of this argument.
9 The ‘constituency fund’ label is currently applied 
to four funding channels providing discretionary 
financing to MPs: the Rural Livelihood Development 
Fund, the Rural Constituency Development Fund, 
the Millennium Development Fund, and the 
Constituency Micro-Projects Fund.
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10 See various reports of the Office of the Auditor 
General for extensive documentation of corruption 
and inappropriate use of public funds, available from 
<http://www.oag.gov.sb/publications.html>.
11  North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009:xii) identify the 
extraction of Weberian institutionalised, impersonal, 
professional loyalties from broader kin-based social 
loyalties as a defining feature of ‘open access’ states, 
and one that is shared by only about 25 countries.
12 Author’s calculations based on Solomon Islands 
electoral commission data. 
13 See Trawen (2006) for a discussion of similar 
motivations for electoral reform in Papua New 
Guinea and May, Wheen, and Haley (2011) for a 
discussion of the impact of the new preferential 
voting system. So far, these reforms seem to have 
done little to reduce the number of candidates 
standing for election or increased the share of votes 
won by successful candidates.
14 All figures from Solomon Islands Government budget 
documents available at <http://www.mof.gov.sb>. 
15 Mushtaq Khan (2009) identifies this as a core 
problem of traditional ‘market enabling’ economic 
development reform strategies. 
16 Winters and Martin (2004) have shown that geograph-
ical factors fundamentally undermine manufacturing 
and service export competitiveness of countries of 
Solomon Islands’ size and distance from major markets. 
17 See Haque and Greig (2010:18–22) for a more 
complete elaboration of this argument. 
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